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1887 
Prosser’s  Privacy  Law:  A  Mixed  Legacy 
Neil M. Richards† 
Daniel J. Solove†† 
This Article examines the complex ways in which William 
Prosser shaped the development of the American law of tort privacy. 
Although Prosser certainly gave tort privacy an order and legitimacy 
that it had previously lacked, he also stunted its development in ways 
that limited its ability to adapt to the problems of the Information 
Age. His skepticism about privacy, as well as his view that tort 
privacy lacked conceptual coherence, led him to categorize the law 
into a set of four narrow categories and strip it of any guiding 
concept   to   shape   its   future   development.   Prosser’s   legacy   for   tort  
privacy   law   is   thus   a   mixed   one:   He   greatly   increased   the   law’s  
stature at the cost of giving it no guidance and making it less able to 
adapt to new circumstances in the future. If tort privacy is to remain 
vital  in  a  digital  age,  it  must  move  beyond  Prosser’s  conception. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is impossible to talk about privacy in American tort law without 
considering William Prosser. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis may have 
popularized privacy in American law with their famous 1890 article, The Right 
to Privacy,1 but  Prosser  was  the  law’s  chief  architect. Prosser divided Warren 
and   Brandeis’s   vague   “right   to   privacy”   into   a   taxonomy   of   four   torts   and  
introduced it as a major topic in both academic and practical understandings of 
tort law.2 Whereas Warren and Brandeis planted the germinal seed for tort 
privacy,3 Prosser systematized and organized the law, giving it an order and 
legitimacy that it had previously lacked. Unsurprisingly, scholars have 
recognized Prosser as an essential figure in furthering the development of the 
privacy torts.4 Edward   Bloustein   recognized   as   early   as   1964   that   Prosser’s  
“influence  on  the  development  of  the  law  of  privacy  begins  to  rival  in  our  day  
that  of  Warren  and  Brandeis.”5  
In this Article, we examine the complicated relationship between Prosser 
and privacy law. In many subtle and not-so-subtle ways, inadvertently and 
intentionally, Prosser had a profound impact on the structure and future 
development of tort privacy. Although his contributions to privacy law are best 
remembered for his 1960 California Law Review article, Privacy,6 Prosser was 
engaged with tort privacy throughout his career, from his earliest torts 
scholarship in the 1940s until his death in 1972. Over this period he was the 
key figure in shaping the way tort law understood and conceptualized privacy. 
Prosser first began to think and write about tort privacy fifty years after Warren 
and  Brandeis’s  article. On the occasion of a half-century since the publication 
of his most famous contribution to the law of privacy, this Article attempts a 
critical  assessment  of  Prosser’s  legacy  to  the  American  law  of  privacy,  in  tort  
law as well as more generally.  
 
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4  193 
(1890). 
2. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s   Other   Path:   Recovering   the   Law   of  
Confidentiality, 96  123, 149 (2007) [hereinafter Richards & Solove, Privacy’s  Other  
Path]. 
3. Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 
 326, 327 (1966). 
4. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 . 
1539, 1554 (1997). 
5. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser, 39 . 962, 964 (1964). 
6. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48  383, 388–89 (1960) (dividing tort 
privacy into four distinct torts).  
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Today, the chorus of opinion is that the tort law of privacy has been 
ineffective, particularly in remedying the burgeoning collection, use, and 
dissemination of personal information in the Information Age.7 Diane 
Zimmerman notes that the public disclosure of private facts tort—perhaps the 
tort   most   central   to   Warren   and   Brandeis’s   concern about media privacy 
violations—“failed   to   become   a   usable   and   effective   means   of   redress   for  
plaintiffs.”8 Danielle Citron observes that the privacy torts have severe limitations 
in combating Internet harassment.9 James  Whitman  argues   that   “it is generally 
conceded that, after a century of legal history, [the privacy torts inspired by 
Warren   and   Brandeis]   amount[]   to   little   in   American   practice   today.”10 
Lawrence   Friedman   states   that   “[i]n   hindsight,   it   looks   as   if   the  Warren   and  
Brandeis idea of privacy—protection from the despicable nosiness of the 
media—never  got  much  past  the  starting  post;;  and  is  now  effectively  dead.”11 
Prosser bears at least some responsibility for the failure of the privacy 
torts to evolve in response to the technological and cultural developments of the 
last fifty years. He shaped the torts into their current form, and their strengths 
and weaknesses flow directly from his vision of privacy.  
Prosser did not create tort privacy, but through careful attention he gave it 
the order and visibility that only a scholar of his influence could have done. 
Prosser’s   engagement   with   the   privacy   tort   cases   over   four   decades   allowed  
him to reduce a mess of hundreds of conflicting cases to a scheme of four 
related but distinct tort actions. He accomplished this feat through careful 
reading and scholarly pruning in the twentieth-century doctrinalist tradition. 
Thus, by 1960 he could confidently assert in his article that Warren and 
Brandeis’s   “right   to   privacy”   consisted   of   not   just   one   tort   but   “four   distinct  
kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied 
together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common 
except that each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff, in the 
phrase  coined  by  Judge  Cooley,  ‘to  be  let  alone.’”12 Prosser organized the torts 
as follows: 
1.   Intrusion   upon   the   plaintiff’s   seclusion   or   solitude,   or   into   his  
 
 7. See, e.g., 
57–62 (2004) (critiquing privacy torts in addressing problems involving 
the collection, processing, and dissemination of personal data); Patricia Sanchez Abril, A 
(My)Space  of  One’s  Own:  On  Privacy and Online Social Networks, 6 
 73, 78–81 (2007) (noting the limitations and ineffectiveness of the privacy torts in 
addressing harms caused by online gossip). 
 8. Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and 
Brandeis’s  Privacy  Tort, 68 . 291, 362 (1983). 
 9. Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89  61, 89 (2009). 
10. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 
1151, 1204 (2004). 
11. Lawrence M. Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted Matters in 
Legal History, 30 . 1093, 1125 (2002). 
12. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6, at 389. 
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private affairs. 
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 
4.  Appropriation,  for  the  defendant’s  advantage,  of  the  plaintiff’s  name  
or likeness.13 
Although he often stated that his methods were those of a collector and a 
synthesizer rather than a critic or theorist, Prosser held normative views of 
privacy law that influenced the way he classified the torts. Prosser was deeply 
skeptical of the privacy torts, and he expressed this skepticism in his California 
Law Review article. Despite taking a restrained tone, Prosser disapproved of 
privacy   law’s   trajectory. In particular, he was concerned that its haphazard 
development threatened to swallow up established doctrines, such as 
defamation law, as well as new doctrines, such as intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, that he felt had greater promise. Therefore, to the extent that 
Prosser tried to shape the future course of privacy law, he aimed to steer it in a 
more cautious and limited direction than it had taken previously.  
Courts readily embraced Prosser’s  formulation  of  privacy  tort  law. As the 
leading torts scholar of his time, Prosser was able to ensure that his 
interpretation of the privacy torts became the dominant one. In addition to 
being the most well-regarded torts scholar, Prosser was the leading treatise 
writer and casebook author. He was also the chief reporter for the Second 
Restatement of Torts, in which he codified his scheme for tort privacy. His 
influence encouraged courts and commentators to adopt his division of tort 
privacy into the four causes of action of intrusion, disclosure, false light, and 
appropriation. Even today, most courts look to the Restatement’s  formulation  of  
the privacy torts as the primary authority.  
We   therefore   conclude   that   Prosser’s   legacy   is   a   mixed   one:   Although 
Prosser gave tort privacy order and legitimacy, he also stunted its development 
in ways that have limited its ability to adapt to the problems of the Information 
Age. His skepticism about privacy, as well as his view that tort privacy lacked 
conceptual coherence, led him to categorize the law into a set of four narrow 
and rigid categories. This move stripped privacy law of any guiding concept to 
shape its future development. Prosser   thus   greatly   increased   tort   privacy’s  
stature at the cost of making it harder for privacy law to adapt to new 
circumstances in the future.  
After   Prosser’s   death   in   1972,   the   torrid   development   of   tort   privacy  
slowed, and the torts ossified—due,  in  significant  part,  to  Prosser’s  codification  
of his scheme of tort privacy in the Second Restatement of Torts. In many ways, 
overtly and subtly, Prosser thus retarded the growth of the very torts he had 
identified. The generative and creative energy sparked by the Warren and 
Brandeis article was calmed. As a consequence, the privacy torts struggle to 
 
13. Id.  
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remain vital and relevant to the privacy problems of the Information Age. 
In  Part  I,  we  identify  and  contextualize  Prosser’s  arguments  in  Privacy, in 
light of his work as a whole and the tort law of privacy he inherited. In Part II, 
we develop  our  normative  critique  of  Prosser’s  theory  of  privacy. We contend 
that while Prosser gave the American tort law of privacy a legitimacy and a 
coherence that it had previously lacked, his approach stultified the law, omitted 
a number of important interests from its taxonomy, and ultimately lacked a 
theory of privacy suitable to guide the future development of the law. Although 
Prosser remains a critical figure in the development of privacy law, his 
contribution to this development came at the cost of stunting any further growth 
in the law. In Part III, we examine the ways in which the privacy torts have not 
been responsive to the problems of the Information Age. We suggest that to be 
vital in the future, the law of tort privacy must move beyond Prosser’s  
conception of privacy. Only if it does this can tort privacy adapt and remain 
relevant in the Information Age.  
I. 
PROSSER’S INFLUENCE ON PRIVACY LAW 
A.  From  Warren  and  Brandeis  to  Prosser:  Privacy  Law’s  First  Fifty  Years 
When William Prosser first began to write about privacy law around 1940, 
he was working in the shadow of another privacy article that had just celebrated 
a fiftieth anniversary—Warren   and   Brandeis’s   famous   1890   Harvard Law 
Review article, The Right to Privacy.14 Before Warren and Brandeis, the Anglo-
American common law had protected a variety of interests that modern lawyers 
would consider as involving privacy. Legal doctrines protecting these interests 
included blackmail law, evidentiary privileges, and duties of confidentiality 
imposed on a variety of special relationships.15 Warren  and  Brandeis’s  article  
dramatically changed this landscape. 
Through a creative reading of the existing precedents on literary property, 
confidentiality, and defamation, Warren and Brandeis argued that the common 
law should be read to protect a right to privacy.16 They argued that the common 
law, with its evolving protections against emotional and psychological injuries, 
implicitly  included  a  right  against  one’s  private  affairs  being  “proclaimed  from  
the house-tops,”  whether  by  the  circulation  of  unauthorized  photographs  or  the  
publication of private, potentially embarrassing facts. They termed their new 
right  “the  right  to  be  let  alone,”17 and theorized that it protected against injuries 
 
14. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1. 
15. See Richards & Solove, Privacy’s  Other  Path, supra note 2, at 133–45 (confidentiality 
and evidentiary privileges); ,
 8187 (2007) (blackmail). 
16. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 213. 
17. Id. at 195 (internal quotation marks omitted). Warren and Brandeis borrowed the phrase 
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to  a  person’s  “inviolate  personality.”  
Warren  and  Brandeis’s  approach  to  privacy  was  in  one  sense  profoundly  
conservative, as it was part of a broader legal strategy employed by late-
nineteenth-century elites to protect their reputations from the masses in the face 
of disruptive social and technological change.18 In another sense, however, 
Warren  and  Brandeis’s  article  was  both  progressive  and  creative:   the law did 
not protect against disclosures outside established relationships, so the authors 
ingeniously re-imagined the law in a way that would.19 Because intrusive 
reporters did not have a pre-existing relationship with the subjects of their 
photos and articles, Warren and Brandeis cleverly shifted the focus of the law 
of nondisclosure from duties in relationships to hurt feelings and damaged 
personalities.20 They noted that their proposed remedies against intrusive media 
were in some tension with the freedom of the press, but argued that judges 
could properly balance the interests between privacy and the public interest in 
disclosure. Although they discussed several potential legal options to protect 
the right to privacy, they viewed tort law as the principal remedy.21 
Most law review articles register little impact on the development of law, 
and at first, it appeared the Warren and Brandeis article would suffer a similar 
fate. Although a few early cases toyed with recognizing tort protections of 
privacy, and California enacted a short-lived and ineffective22 privacy statute in 
1899,23 it took over a decade before a privacy tort became clearly established 
under state law.24 In the celebrated Roberson case, the New York Court of 
Appeals refused to recognize the tort when a flour company used the picture of 
 
from  Thomas  Cooley’s   treatise on torts. ,  29 (2d ed. 
1888). 
18 , supra note 15, at 221. 
19. See Richards & Solove, Privacy’s  Other  Path, supra note 2, at 147 & n.164. 
20 Id. 
21. Although Warren and Brandeis argued principally that privacy injuries should be 
remedied by tort damages, they also suggested that in some cases injunctive relief and even 
criminal punishment might be appropriate. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 219. 
22.  , 
 64 (1972); Louis Nizer, The   Right   of   Privacy:   A   Half   Century’s  
Developments, 39 . 526, 539 (1941). 
23. 1899 Cal. Stat. 28, codified as Cal. Penal Code § 258 (1899), as repealed by 1915 Cal. 
Stat. 761, provided: 
It shall be unlawful to publish in any newspaper, handbill, poster, book or serial 
publication, or supplement thereto, the portrait of any living person a resident of 
California, other than that of a person holding a public office in this state, without the 
written consent of such person first had and obtained; provided, that it shall be lawful to 
publish the portrait of a person convicted of a crime. It shall likewise be unlawful to 
publish in any newspaper, handbill, poster, book or serial publication or supplement 
thereto, any caricature of any person residing in this state, which caricature will in any 
manner reflect upon the honor, integrity, manhood, virtue, reputation, or business or 
political motives of the person so caricatured, or which tends to expose the individual 
so caricatured to public hatred, ridicule, or contempt. 
24. See Richards & Solove, Privacy’s  Other  Path, supra note 2, at 146–47. 
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an attractive young woman to advertise its flour,25 but after a popular outcry 
against the decision, the New York legislature passed a privacy tort statute 
allowing  people  to  sue  for   invasion  of  privacy  where  their  “name,  portrait,  or  
picture”  was  used  without  consent  “for  purposes  of  trade.”26.  Two years later, 
in the 1905 Pavesich case, the Supreme Court of Georgia recognized the tort 
under almost identical facts.27 
Although courts developed these early torts in response to Warren and 
Brandeis’s   article,   the torts involved a different context from the one that 
Warren and Brandeis had envisioned. They had been principally concerned 
with press intrusion into personal and family life, such as reportage on 
weddings and social events by the gossip columns and society pages of the new 
“Yellow  Press.”28 But the typical fact pattern of the early privacy tort cases was 
one where a business had used the photograph of an ordinary person without 
permission as part of its advertising or trade dress.29 These cases were not about 
press publication of domestic affairs, but what we would now think of more as 
an unfair trade practice.  
Thus, ironically, the first privacy tort to be born from the Warren and 
Brandeis article was the one that Prosser would later categorize as the 
appropriation of name or likeness. Although there are passages in the Warren 
and Brandeis article that are helpful in justifying the appropriation tort, it was 
not what the authors primarily had in mind. But their article aimed to be broad 
and generative, and they refrained from suggesting one or a few specific torts to 
remedy privacy violations. Their article could therefore serve as an inspiration 
and foundation for a variety of different privacy protections.  
Although most of the early privacy cases involved the misuse of 
photographs in advertising, courts during the interwar period began to 
recognize liability for the disclosure of personal information. Two cases were 
particularly influential. In Brents v. Morgan, the Kentucky Supreme Court 
found  a  violation  of  privacy  where  a  man  had  posted  a  sign  reading  “Dr.  W.  R.  
Morgan owes an account here of $49.67. And if promises would pay an 
account this account would have been settled long ago. This account will be 
advertised  as  long  as  it  remains  unpaid.”30 Brents produced a flurry of scholarly 
commentary noting the significance of the recognition of a new kind of privacy 
 
25. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).  
26.  §§ 50–51 (McKinney 1903). 
27. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
28. Amy Gajda, What If Samuel D. Warren   Hadn’t   Married   a   Senator’s   Daughter?:  
Uncovering  the  Press  Coverage  That  Led  to  the  “Right  to  Privacy,”  2008 . 35, 
43–44 (2008). The  “Yellow  Press”  was  a  development  in  American  journalism  at  the  end  of  the  
nineteenth century that focused on sensationalism and “attention   to   local  news,  especially  crime  
and   scandal   and   high   society.”   ,
 95 (1978). 
29  174 
(expanded ed. 2003). 
30. 299 S.W. 967, 968 (Ky. 1927). 
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right  in  Brandeis’s  home  state.31 In 1931, the California Supreme Court decided 
Melvin v. Reid, recognizing a privacy claim by a reformed prostitute against a 
movie which told the story of her colorful earlier life as a sex worker tried for 
murder.32 These cases were precisely what Warren and Brandeis had in mind, 
and further show the adaptability of their call for protection of privacy. 
Other courts and legislatures recognized the tort in the ensuing decades. 
But while tort privacy remained an active source of scholarly commentary,33 
fifty years after the publication of the Warren and Brandeis article, it remained 
a doctrinal backwater. Privacy was a recognized but relatively unusual cause of 
action  that  operated  as  a  “residual  category  of  tort  law,”  picking  up  intentional  
actions resulting in emotional injury that were not covered by the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, or injuries caused by publicity that 
was not actionable defamation.34 It was treated as such by its placement in 
leading treatises35 and casebooks.36 In fact, it remained unclear whether the 
privacy tort would survive as a discrete cause of action, or whether it would be 
swallowed up by the more vibrant tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.37 
 
31. E.g., Leon Green, The Right of Privacy, 27  237 (1932); Rufus Lisle, The 
Right of Privacy (A Contra View), 19  137 (1931); Roy Moreland, The Right of Privacy 
Today, 19  101 (1931); George Ragland, Jr., The Right of Privacy, 17  85 (1929). 
Many of these articles were cited a few years later by Brandeis himself in a Supreme Court case 
that raised a similar fact pattern but was decided differently. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 
301 U.S. 468, 482 n.5 (1937). See generally Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, 
and Speech, 63  1295 (2010)  (explaining  how  Brandeis’s  views  on  privacy  evolved  
over time). 
32. 297 P. 91 (Cal. 1931). 
33. E.g., Green, supra note 31; Lisle, supra note 31; Moreland, supra note 31; Nizer, supra 
note 22;;   Denis   O’Brien,   The Right of Privacy, 2 437 (1902); Roscoe Pound, 
Interests of Personality, 28 343 (1915). 
34 , supra note 29, at 174. 
35. See, e.g., , 69 
(1926)  (noting  the  uncertainty  of  the  “modern  claim”  of  privacy  in  a  chapter  on  the  nature  of  tort  
law generally); ,  288–91 (1917) (giving 
privacy a brief chapter  and  discussing  cases  involving  the  use  of  a  plaintiff’s  name  or  portrait  for  
advertising purposes); ,  601–04 
(1933)  (placing  privacy  as  part  of  a  final  chapter  on  “miscellaneous  interests”). 
36. For instance, both Roscoe Pound and then Zechariah Chafee published supplements to 
their standard equitable relief casebooks that included privacy and defamation cases separately, to 
emphasize the evolving nature of the law. See ,
 
(1933); ,
(1916); see also , ,
 797–806 (3d ed. 1919) (adding a chapter entitled 
“Interference  with  Privacy”). 
37. , supra note 29, at 173–74. Prosser himself wondered the same thing in various 
editions of his treatise. See, e.g., ,  1053–
54 (1st ed. 1941) [hereinafter , ]; ,
 (2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter , ]. 
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Moreover, despite the attention it received in the law review literature, at 
its half-century mark, privacy remained not only a minority doctrine, but one 
that had undergone little theoretical refinement or evolution. The 1934 
Restatement (First) of Torts recognized  a  cause  of  action  for  “unreasonable  and  
serious”   invasion   of   privacy.38 But by 1940, privacy had been recognized in 
only a distinct minority of U.S. jurisdictions—by common law in twelve states 
(California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina) and 
by statute in only two others (New York and Utah).39 Thus, at its fifty-year 
mark, privacy was no more than an interesting but minor doctrine in tort law. 
B.  Prosser’s  Privacy in Context 
William Prosser was born in 1898, eight years after Warren and Brandeis 
penned their article, and he graduated from the University of Minnesota with 
his law degree in 1928.40 After a brief stint as a practicing lawyer, he returned 
to teach at Minnesota the next year as an adjunct, and became a full-time 
professor in 1930. He first taught torts in 1934, and published a series of 
articles on tort law during the 1930s.41 
Although   Prosser’s   papers   do   not   survive,   we   know   a   little   about how 
Prosser thought about torts in the late 1930s from a student notebook from one 
of his torts classes in 1938–1939.42 The notebook belonged to Leroy S. 
Merrifield, who went on to become a distinguished torts professor at George 
Washington University. The   notebook   is   organized   like   Prosser’s   casebooks  
and treatises—after some introductory materials, the notes start with intentional 
torts,   including   one   of   Prosser’s   favorite   topics,   the   intentional   infliction   of  
emotional distress. Subsequent months cover negligence, strict liability, and 
finally, miscellaneous issues, including damages. Although the notebook cites 
cases that have been understood both at the time and by modern scholars as 
 
38  § 867 (1939).  
39. Nizer, supra note 22, at 529. In addition to those twelve states, the tort had been 
recognized in the District of Columbia and in the Alaska territory. Id. 
40. Craig Joyce, Keepers of the Flame: Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (Fifth 
Edition) and the Prosser Legacy, 39  851, 852 (1986). 
41. Although Prosser published a short review of a torts treatise in 1933, see William L. 
Prosser, Book Review, 19 257 (1935) (reviewing 
 (1933)),   Prosser’s   torts   scholarship   began   in   earnest once he 
became a full-time torts teacher. See, e.g., William L. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 
25  413 (1937); William L. Prosser, The Minnesota Court on Proximate Cause, 21 
 19 (1936); William L. Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 
 241 (1936); William L. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Collisions of Carriers with 
Other Vehicles, 30 . 980 (1936); William L. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Reply to 
Professor Carpenter, 10  459 (1937). 
42. Christopher J. Robinette, The Prosser Notebook: Classroom as Biography and 
Intellectual History, 2010  577 (2010); Leroy S. Merrifield, Prosser Torts Notebook, 
http://sunsite2.berkeley.edu:8088/xdlib//prosser/ucb/mets/cubanc_67_1_00064213.xml (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2010). 
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implicating privacy,43 Prosser does not appear to have devoted any significant 
classroom time to tort privacy as such.44 
Prosser’s  views  on  the  significance  of  tort  privacy  seem  to  have  changed  
shortly thereafter. In fact, his views on privacy can be measured over time by 
looking not just at his 1960 article, but at the various editions of his casebooks 
and treatises between 1941 and 1972. All  of  these  texts  share  Prosser’s  typical  
scholarly methodology of reading lots of cases, and then restating them as 
embodying several clear legal principles.45 Moreover, many of them share 
identical language, representing the revision over a period of thirty years of the 
same document, and the same arguments about the state of the law of privacy. 
Prosser confessed to copying extensively from his own previous work, and in 
the preface to the 1955 second edition of his treatise, he quoted a poem by 
Kipling  for   the  proposition  that  “[r]esearch  has  been  defined  as  plagiarism  on  
the   grand   scale.”46 One   of   the   most   frequently   repeated   claims   in   Prosser’s  
privacy writings is some variant of the sentence   that   privacy   represents   “the  
outstanding  example  of  the  influence  of  legal  periodicals”  on  American  law.47 
As  it   turned  out,  Prosser’s  own  scholarship  would   transform  privacy   law  in  a  
number of important ways.48 
Prosser’s  first  detailed  discussion  of  privacy49 appeared in the first edition 
of his treatise, Prosser on Torts, published in 1941.50 Prosser gave privacy a 
short  treatment  at  the  end  of  the  book,  along  with  other  “Miscellaneous”  topics  
 
43. For instance, on page 34 of the notebook, as part of his treatment of fraudulent consent, 
Prosser alluded to the facts of DeMay v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881). In DeMay, a doctor 
was held liable when he allowed a young man called Scattergood to watch a woman give birth and 
to hold her hands when she was under the mistaken impression that Scattergood was also a doctor. 
Id. at 146–47. Mrs.  Roberts  sued,  alleging  that  DeMay  and  Scattergood  had  “intruded  upon  [her]  
privacy,”   and   the   court   agreed,   holding   that   Roberts   had   “a   legal   right   to   the   privacy   of   her  
apartment at such a time, and the law secures to her this right by requiring others to observe it, and 
to  abstain  from  its  violation.” Id. at 149. The  court  used  the  word  “privacy”  twice  at  critical  points,  
but  it  formally  labeled  the  wrong  as  “deceit.” Id. 
44. Our examination of the notebook did not find any mention of privacy. This accords 
with a forthcoming study of the notebook, which does not mention privacy either. See Robinette, 
supra note 42. 
45. For  a  discussion  of  Prosser’s  methodology,   see Joyce, supra note 40, at 855; , 
supra note 29, at 172–73; see also infra Part III.D. 
46 , , supra note 37, at xii. 
47. , , supra note 37, at 1050; 
 1135 (1st ed. 1952) [hereinafter , 
]; , , supra note 37, at 635; Prosser, 
Privacy, supra note 6, at 383. 
48 , supra note 29, at 173. 
49. Prosser made a passing reference to privacy in his 1939 article on the intentional 
infliction of emotional  distress,  but  characterized  it  as  “nothing  more  than  a  right  to  be  free  from  
the  intentional  infliction  of  mental  suffering.”  William  L.  Prosser,  Intentional Infliction of Mental 
Suffering: A New Tort, 37 874, 884 (1939) [hereinafter Prosser, Intentional 
Infliction of Mental Suffering].  
50 , , supra note 37. Subsequent  editions  in  Prosser’s  lifetime  
were published in 1955, 1964, and 1972. 
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such as immunities, joint torts, and the remedy of restitution.51 Prosser’s  
discussion of privacy had three elements. First, he noted that although it 
remained   a   minority   doctrine,   “the   majority   of   the   courts   which   have  
considered   the  question  have  recognized   the  existence  of  a   right  of   ‘privacy,’  
which will be protected against interferences which are serious and outrageous, 
or   beyond   the   limits   of   common   ideas   of   decent   conduct.”52 Second, in his 
characteristic style, Prosser had already begun to subdivide the mass of privacy 
cases into discrete causes of action, namely, “[1]   intrusions  on   the  plaintiff’s  
solitude, [2] publicity given to his name or likeness, or to private information 
about him, and [3] the commercial appropriation of elements of his 
personality.”53 Although they were in embryonic form, one can see that as early 
as 1941, Prosser had identified three of the four torts he discussed in his 1960 
article—intrusion, disclosure, and appropriation. All that was missing was the 
false light tort, which Prosser later acknowledged was the least important of the 
four.54 Third, Prosser discussed the limitations on the right, namely, “a  
privilege to publish matters of news value, or of public interest of a legitimate 
character.”55 As commentators before him had done, he noted that the 
distinction between public and private matters had been drawn in the tort law 
“for   the   protection   of   the   freedom   of   speech   and   press.”56 Prosser 
acknowledged the difficulty in drawing this distinction, but then offered the 
curious  example   that   “a  difference  may  at   least  be   found  between  a  harmless 
report of a private wedding and the morbid publication of the picture of a 
deformed  child.”57 This example is puzzling given the origins of the right of 
privacy  in  the  Warrens’  irritation  at  the  publicity  given  to  their  own  wedding,58 
especially since Prosser himself understood this fact pattern to have been 
Warren  and  Brandeis’s  impetus  for  writing  their  article.59 
Prosser took a leave of absence from teaching during the 1940s. After a 
year at Harvard, he assumed the deanship at Boalt Hall at the University of 
California (Berkeley) in 1948.60 He published a torts casebook in 1952,61 and in 
 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. (numerals added). 
54. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6,   at   400   (noting   that   there   “has   been   a   good   deal   of  
overlapping  of  defamation  in  the  false  light  cases”). 
55 , , supra note 37, at 1050. 
56. Id. at 1060. 
57 , , supra note 37, at 1062. 
58. Gajda, supra note 28, at 37. 
59. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6, at 383. Prosser believed that the press coverage 
surrounding   the   wedding   of   Warren’s   daughter   had   inspired the article, although subsequent 
scholarship has proven that this could not actually have been the case. See , supra note 22, 
at 23–24; James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 
(1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13  875, 891–93 (1979); Gajda, 
supra note 28, at 38–39; Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992  1335, 
1348–49 (1992). 
60. Robinette, supra note 42, at 586. 
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February 1953 delivered a series of prestigious lectures at the University of 
Michigan . In a curious coincidence, the lectures were named after Thomas 
Cooley, the distinguished  Michigan  jurist  who  had  first  coined  the  phrase  “the  
right   to   be   let   alone.” Fittingly, in his lectures, published in book form in 
1954,62 Prosser announced his fully developed four-part approach to tort 
privacy, with the inclusion of the false light tort. This fourth privacy tort, 
“which   ha[d]   made   a   rather   amorphous   appearance   in   half   a   dozen   cases,”  
consisted  of  portraying  the  plaintiff  “in  a  false  but  not  necessarily  defamatory  
position in the public eye, as by attributing to him views that he does not hold, 
or  conduct  with  which  he  cannot  fairly  be  charged.”63 
Thereafter,   all   of   Prosser’s   writings   on   privacy   featured   the   four-part 
scheme. In the second edition of his treatise, published in 1955,64 Prosser 
summarized his understanding of the state of law as follows: 
Most courts now recognize the existence of a right of privacy, which 
will be protected against interferences which are serious and 
outrageous, or beyond the limits of common ideas of dangerous 
conduct. The right has been held to cover intrusions upon the 
plaintiff’s   solitude;;   publicity   given   to   his   name   or   likeness,   or   to  
private information about him; placing him in a false light in the public 
eye; and the commercial appropriation of elements of his personality. 
The right is subject to a privilege to publish matters of news value, or 
of public interest of a legitimate kind.65 
Like the first edition of the treatise from which it was adapted, this passage also 
contains   the   three   hallmarks   of   Prosser’s   conception   of   tort   privacy:   (1)   its  
recognition by courts as protecting against outrageous breaches of social 
conduct resulting in emotional injury; (2) its division of the vague case law into 
a complex of what were now four distinct injuries; and (3) the nagging conflict 
between the right to privacy and the right of a free press to report the news.  
Viewed   in   the   context   of   Prosser’s   writings   on   privacy   as   a   whole,   his  
1960 article broke relatively little new ground. Prosser still essentially 
rehearsed the state of his thoughts about privacy law up to that point, in some 
cases using identical language to the treatise.66 He made his now-familiar 
 
61 , , supra note 47. Although Prosser coauthored the 
casebook with Young Smith, the Dean of Columbia Law School, the chapter on privacy draws 
heavily and directly on the text of his 1941 treatise. 
62 ,  (1954). 
63. Id. at 119. 
64 , , supra note 37. 
65. Id. at 635. 
66. See, for example, the reappearance of the trope that the Warren and Brandeis article 
“has   come   to   be   regarded   as   the   outstanding   example   of   the   influence   of   legal   periodicals   on  
American   law,”   at   383,   and   the   claim   that  Warren   and   Brandeis   gathered   decisions   “in  which  
relief had been afforded on the basis of defamation, or the invasion of some property right, or a 
breach of confidence or an implied contract, the article concluded that such cases were in reality 
based  upon  a  broader  principle  which  was  entitled  to  separate  recognition,”  at  384. Compare id. 
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argument  that   the  right   to  privacy  remedied  emotional   injury,   that   it  was  “not  
one   tort,   but   a   complex   of   four,”   that   had   little   in   common   except   that   they 
were injuries to the right to be alone,67 and that a number of the torts (especially 
false light and disclosure) were in tension with the interest in protecting a free 
press.68 
Although the text and structure of the article share a consistent message, 
organization, and language with his torts books, in a number of places Prosser 
went beyond the more narrowly descriptive language of his treatise and was 
more analytical and even opinionated about the state of the law in 1960 and its 
likely course in the future. Perhaps because it was a law review article with a 
scholarly rather than a student or practitioner audience, Prosser was 
unconstrained by the doctrinal or pedagogical limitations imposed by the 
treatise or casebook formats. As such, it represents the fullest statement of his 
normative conception of tort privacy. Thus, for example, he worried that the 
false light tort was “swallowing   up   and   engulfing   the   whole   law   of   public  
defamation; and whether there is any false libel printed, for example, in a 
newspaper,  which  cannot  be  redressed  upon  the  alternative  ground.”69 And in a 
number of places, Prosser also considered the numerous procedural and 
substantive protections that tort law had developed in the context of defamation 
to protect a free press against overbroad causes of action for slander and libel. 
In the context of tort privacy, he wondered rhetorically whether it was “of  so  
little consequence that [it] may be circumvented in so casual and cavalier a 
fashion?”70 
At the end of Privacy, Prosser concluded with two pages of analysis in 
which he opined further about the state of the law, expressing his worries about 
privacy  law’s  chaotic  energy. In a departure from his mode as treatise writer, he 
complained that although courts had created four separate and “loosely  related  
torts”  based  upon  the  suggestion  of  Warren  and  Brandeis,  “[s]o  far  as  appears  
from the decisions, the process has gone on without any plan, without much 
realization of what is happening or its significance, and without any 
consideration of its dangers. They are nonetheless sufficiently obvious, and not 
to  be  overlooked.”71 Prosser suggested that privacy law might have gone too far 
in a non-orderly   way,   and   “that   it   is   high   time   that   we   realize   what   we   are  
doing, and give some consideration to the question of where, if anywhere, we 
 
with , , supra note 37,  at  635  (“[A]  number  of  cases  in  which  relief  had  
been afforded on the basis of defamation, invasion of some property right, or breach of confidence 
or an implied contract, and concluded that they were in reality based upon a broader principle 
which  was  entitled  to  separate  recognition.”). 
67. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6, at 389. 
68. See id. at 410. 
69. Id. at 401. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 422. 
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are  to  call  a  halt.”72 
Chief among the dangers evident from the reported privacy decisions, 
Prosser believed, was his earlier theme—“the   extent   to   which   defenses,  
limitations and safeguards established for the protection of the defendant in 
other  tort  fields  have  been  jettisoned,  disregarded,  or  ignored.”73 For example, 
he   was   concerned   that   although   the   intrusion   tort’s   main   element   was   the  
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the tort of intentional infliction had 
already (under his own guidance74) been established. The intentional infliction 
tort required proof of such elements as extreme outrage, non-trivial injuries, 
and serious mental harm (often requiring physical proof), but intrusion lacked 
these important protections for defendants.75 Prosser was worried that the 
current law of intrusion would allow liability for those suffering merely trivial 
or objectively unreasonable offenses.76 He was also concerned that the 
appropriation tort created a new intellectual property right at the whim of a jury 
that   was   in   no   way   constrained   by   “any   of   the   limitations   which   have   been  
considered necessary and desirable in the ordinary law of trade marks and trade 
names.”77 
Prosser expressed even greater concern that the same pattern was 
emerging in the false light and disclosure contexts, since both torts touched on 
reputation and thus encroached upon the territory of defamation. He argued that 
the danger posed by overbroad privacy torts in this area was especially severe 
because the procedural protections developed to protect free speech and a free 
press  “as  a   result  of  some  centuries  of  conflict . . . are now turned on the left 
flank.”78 Prosser   lamented   the  absence   in  privacy   law  of  defamation’s  careful  
protections such as the defense of truth, retraction statutes, proof of special 
damages,  and  requirement  of  “the  need  for  any  defamatory  innuendo  at  all”  —
since liability could arise from the publication of non-defamatory truthful facts 
or  even  “laudatory   fiction.”79 Worse still was the prospect that under tests as 
vague  as  “‘ordinary  sensibilities’  or  the  ‘mores’  of  the  community  as  to  what  is  
acceptable and proper, the courts, although cautiously and reluctantly, have 
accepted a power of censorship over what the public may be permitted to read, 
extending very much beyond that which they have always had under the law of 
defamation.”80 In  this  way,  Prosser  revealed  his  fear  of  privacy  law’s  trajectory,  
and he criticized its energetic growth as a threat to the nuanced, moderated, and 
 
72. Id. at 423. 
73. Id. at 422. 
74 , supra note 29, at 102–05; see also William L. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 
. 40 (1956) [hereinafter Prosser, Insult and Outrage]. 
75. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6, at 422. 
76. Compare id. with Prosser, Insult and Outrage, supra note 74. 
77. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6, at 423. 
78. Id. at 422. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 423. 
RichardsSolove.FINAL.doc (Do Not Delete) 2/11/2011 11:17 AM 
2010] PROSSER’S  MIXED  LEGACY 1901 
technical model of tort law which he had spent his whole career identifying, 
refining, and promoting.  
Prosser’s   doctrinal   restatement   of   privacy   law   in   his   treatises   and   other  
works should best be seen as an attempt to rein in privacy law, to regularize it 
and bring it into harmony with the rest of tort law. Prosser’s   writings   on  
privacy from the publication of Privacy until his death in 1972 are best viewed 
as refining, restating, and entrenching into legal doctrine the concepts he 
developed earlier in his career. Although it again followed the form of prior 
editions, the privacy chapter in the 1964 third edition of his treatise was able to 
announce the near-widespread recognition of some or all of his four torts under 
the common law of the District of Columbia and thirty-one states, the codes of 
four other states, and its likely adoption in four more.81 In the little more than 
two decades since the publication of his first   torts   treatise   in   1941,  Prosser’s  
conception of tort privacy had become a majority doctrine.  
Prosser’s   skills   as   a   doctrinalist   contributed   directly   to   this   process. For 
instance, in 1964 the New Hampshire Supreme Court decided Hamberger v. 
Eastman,  an  intrusion  case  which  explicitly  adopted  Prosser’s  four-part scheme 
by citing with approval the recently-published third edition of his treatise.82. In 
the 1967 edition of his casebook and in subsequent privacy writings, Prosser 
could then cite Hamberger as judicial authority for his own conception of tort 
privacy.83 Such a process—(1) the categorization of cases to create doctrine; (2) 
the adoption of the categories by a court; and then (3) the citation of the case as 
evidence of the categorization—was   the   hallmark   of   Prosser’s   method   at   its  
most influential, in privacy as well as other areas of tort law.84 
Prosser’s   prediction   that   the   privacy   torts   would   come   into   increasing  
tension with press freedoms also came to pass. Prior to the 1960s, tort lawsuits 
were considered private actions not attributable to the state that did not 
implicate First Amendment scrutiny.85 Because the First Amendment was 
inapplicable as a direct matter, tort law treated First Amendment interests in 
freedom of speech and press not as superseding considerations but as 
endogenous interests that were balanced in the crafting of legal rules. In torts 
such as defamation or the disclosure of private facts, the First Amendment 
interests  were  weighed  against   the  plaintiff’s   interests   in  her   reputation  or   the  
emotional injury that would result from publication.86 Thus, the discussion in 
privacy law about the newsworthiness privilege in the disclosure tort took place 
 
81  831–32 (3d ed. 1964) 
[hereinafter , ].  
82. 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964). 
83  (4th ed. 
1967) [hereinafter , ]. 
84 , supra note 29, at 175–77. 
85. Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109 
. 1650, 1658 (2009) [hereinafter Solove & Richards, Rethinking Free Speech]. 
86. Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 . 387, 430–31 (2008). 
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through balancing within the confines of tort law, and not by measuring tort 
law by reference to any external yardstick of minimum constitutionality.  
This all changed in 1964, when the Supreme Court held in New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan that private law rules restricting speech were subject to 
constitutional restrictions, just like criminal statutes that did the same thing.87 
The Court also held that some of the procedural protections that defamation law 
had developed to protect a free press were constitutionally required—most 
notably the requirement that truth be a defense to libel.88 Henceforth, state-
created tort law rules would have to provide minimum protections for speech 
and press, or be declared unconstitutional as violating the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.89 This would particularly be the case for torts like defamation 
and privacy that created civil liability for speech.  
On the heels of the Sullivan decision, the Supreme Court decided a line of 
cases holding that torts imposing civil liability for speech would be held to a 
heightened standard of constitutionality.90 Most notably, in the case of Time, 
Inc. v. Hill, the Supreme Court applied its new rules directly to the false light 
tort.91 Holding that liability under the false light tort raised many of the 
censorship concerns that had troubled the Court in Sullivan, the Court held that 
Sullivan’s  “actual  malice”  standard  applied  to  false  light  as  well,  requiring  the 
plaintiff   to  prove   that   the  defendant  had  acted  with  “actual  malice”—that the 
defendant had either knowingly made a false statement or had acted recklessly 
with regard to the truth.92 It remained an open question whether the disclosure 
tort, which remedied the disclosure of truthful private facts, would be next.93 
His 1960 predictions about the collision course between privacy and 
speech having come to pass, Prosser responded to these developments in the 
1972 edition of his treatise, the fourth and final edition published in his 
lifetime.94 Recognizing the momentous shift in the law occasioned by the 
 
87. 376  U.S.  254,  277  (1964)  (“What  a  State  may  not  constitutionally  bring  about  by  means  
of a criminal statute is  likewise  beyond  the  reach  of  its  civil  law  of  libel.”) 
88. Id. at 279–80 (discussing the actual malice standard). 
89. Solove & Richards, Rethinking Free Speech, supra note 85, at 1656–57.  
90. Id. at 1658–60. 
91. 385 U.S. 374, 390–91 (1967). 
92. Id. 
93. The Court addressed this issue in the 1975 case of Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 
46, 495–96 (1975). In that case, the Court held that a disclosure tort action was unconstitutional 
where it provided liability for truthful speech by the press where the information was in the public 
record. Although pressed by the media defendants to do so, the Court declined to hold that 
disclosure tort actions required proof of falsity, a requirement that would have doomed the tort. In 
a line of privacy/free speech cases reaching to the present, the Court has frequently struck down 
privacy actions on First Amendment grounds, but has refused to hold that tort liability for truthful 
speech is per se unconstitutional. See Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First 
Amendment, 52  1149, 1197 (2005); Solove & Richards, Rethinking Free Speech, 
supra note 85, at 1659–60. 
94. ,  (4th ed. 1971). [hereinafter 
, ]. 
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Supreme  Court’s  constitutionalization  of  tort  law,  Prosser  added  a  new  chapter  
after   the   chapter   on   privacy   entitled   “Constitutional   Privilege.”95 Although 
much of the chapter dealt with Sullivan and defamation law, Prosser concluded 
that Hill had also extended the constitutional privilege of discussion of public 
matters to the privacy context.96 He noted that although the privacy cases had 
developed a common-law privilege of commentary on public figures in the 
disclosure  and  false  light  contexts,  these  privileges  “were  taken  over  under  the  
Constitution,”97 but that future cases would have to work out the contours of 
the constitutional public figure privilege.98 
Prosser’s   final   source   of   influence   over   the   development   of   tort   privacy  
was   in   his   role   in   the   American   Law   Institute’s   revision   of   the   1934  
Restatement of Torts. Prosser served as the reporter for the revised Restatement, 
and he quite predictably incorporated into the Restatement his formulations of 
the privacy torts.99 In 1967, the privacy torts section of the Restatement was 
complete, and an ailing Prosser resigned as reporter in 1970, two years before 
his death in 1972.100 Although the Restatement was not published until 1977, 
the privacy torts section was largely untouched from the version Prosser 
oversaw.101 
II. 
ASSESSING PROSSER’S LEGACY IN PRIVACY LAW 
A. Legitimization 
Although tort privacy was gaining steam before Prosser, he brought it into 
the spotlight of orthodox tort law—worthy of a chapter of its own in treatises 
and as a separate unit in first-year law courses. Prosser gave his attention to 
privacy, and legitimized the tort. His surveys of the hundreds of cases 
recognizing  Warren   and  Brandeis’s   right   to privacy was the most exhaustive 
account of the privacy tort law to date.102 Before Prosser embarked on his 
project, the law appeared unwieldy and sprawling, but he organized the cases 
into   “four   distinct   kinds   of   invasion   of   four   different   interests   of   the 
plaintiff.”103 And in the four decades that Prosser was engaged with privacy 
law, it became transformed from a curious minority rule to a major topic in the 
 
 95. Id. at 819–33. 
 96. Id. at 823. 
 97. Id. at 827. 
 98. Id. at 829–30. 
 99 652A (1977). 
100. Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through 
Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74  887, 897 n.64 (2006). 
101. Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism, The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial Regulation 
of the Press, 97  1039, 1052 n.63 (2009). 
102. See, e.g., Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6, at 388 (noting the existence of more than 
three hundred privacy tort cases). 
103. Id. at 389.  
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law of torts—a doctrine recognized by the overwhelming majority of 
jurisdictions. Today, due in large  part  to  Prosser’s  influence,  his  “complex”  of  
four torts is widely accepted and recognized by almost every state.104 
In his treatment of privacy, Prosser followed his particular pattern of 
scholarship—reading cases, synthesizing them, and then restating them in clear 
form.105 As Craig Joyce has argued, 
Prosser saw spread before him a picture of vast and surfeiting disarray. 
To this untidy scene, he brought order. Prosser viewed the seemingly 
scattershot cases on the various issues of tort law as capable of 
reconciliation and harmonization, if only the individual parts of those 
decisions were disassembled, inventoried, and recombined to illustrate 
the common values that, taken as a whole, they sought to vindicate (or, 
in   Prosser’s   view,   ought to vindicate). In effect, he treated the 
“doctrines”  of  tort  law  as  amalgams  of  principles  and  processes,  each  
of which could be reduced to a relatively simple formula.106 
Prosser’s  treatment  of  the  privacy  cases  exemplified  this  process. In both 
the Privacy article and the various editions of his torts volumes for students, 
practitioners, and judges, Prosser examined numerous divergent and conflicting 
cases, and organized them into a taxonomy of first three, and finally four torts.  
With his fame as the most renowned torts scholar in the United States, 
Prosser’s  attention  to  privacy  law  put  this  burgeoning  yet  often  obscure  body  of  
law on the map. Prosser commanded the field of torts.107 As noted earlier, he 
authored many of the most-influential articles and the leading treatise and 
casebook. He also served as the reporter for the Second Restatement of Torts.108 
As a functional matter, Prosser was as close to a law-maker in torts as a 
legislator or a judge might have been. And as a result of his articles and books 
on privacy law, Prosser brought extensive attention to the privacy torts. He 
transformed  them  from  a  “residual  category  of   tort   law”  into  a  major   topic  of  
law, and an increasingly important topic of scholarly discussion. Before 
Prosser, it is fair to say privacy law was developing quietly. Prosser brought 
privacy law onto center stage.  
B. Fossilization 
In bringing the privacy torts into the mainstream of American tort law, 
Prosser also consciously sought to harmonize them with the law as a whole. 
Paradoxically, while Prosser gave tort privacy a legitimacy it had previously 
lacked, he also fossilized it and eliminated its capacity to change and develop. 
 
104. See, e.g., ,  77 
(2001) (noting that only North Dakota and Wyoming fail to recognize any of the privacy torts in 
some form or another). 
105. White, supra note 29, at 176. 
106. Joyce, supra note 40, at 855. 
107. See, e.g., Joyce, supra note 40; White, supra note 29, at 176. 
108 (1977). 
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When Prosser on Torts was first published in 1941, there were dozens of 
reported privacy decisions in a doctrinal and theoretical mess. Decisions 
invoking  Warren  and  Brandeis’s  “right   to  privacy”   included  cases  against   the  
press for publication of private information,109 advertising cases using photo-
graphs without permission,110 eavesdropping and wiretapping cases,111 private 
commercial disputes,112 and cases resembling trespass,113 defamation,114 and 
the intentional infliction of emotional distress.115 To an unusual degree, the cas-
es embodied the characteristic creativity and ad hoc nature of the common law.  
Although Prosser once dismissed (perhaps with false modesty) his 
approach   as  merely   that   of   a   “packrat,”116 in reality his methods involved as 
much creativity as hard work. Prosser could not come up with one organizing 
principle to unite the privacy cases, and ultimately settled on four distinct 
theories to categorize them. A chief goal of his scholarship was to ensure the 
clear and orderly development of American tort law. Prosser’s  great  scholarly  
gift was the assimilation and synthesis of enormous numbers of decided cases, 
and the restatement of them in clear and lively language.  
Once Prosser had stated the law a certain way, he worked hard to ensure 
that his classifications and conclusions became doctrine.117 The privacy torts 
represent a classic example of the way in which Prosser not only created 
doctrine out of chaos, but persistently ensured the survival of his doctrinal 
formulations. G.E. White characterizes this process as follows: 
A classification made seemingly for convenience (1941) had been 
expanded and refined (1955), hardened and solidified (1960 and 1964, 
when   the   “common   features”   of   privacy   were   declared),   and   finally  
made  synonymous  with  “law”  (1971). Prosser’s  capacity  for  synthesis  
had become a capacity to create doctrine. One began an analysis of tort 
privacy by stating  that  it  consisted  of  “a  complex  of  four  wrongs,”  and  
implicitly, only those wrongs.118 
 
109. See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).  
110. See, e.g., Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911). 
111. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Graham, 37 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1931); McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 2 S.E.2d 810 (Ga. Ct. App. 1939). 
112. See, e.g., Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967 (Ky. 1927). 
113. See, e.g., Byfield v. Candler, 125 S.E. 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1924). 
114. See, e.g., Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939); Brents v. 
Morgan, 299 S.W. 967 (Ky. 1927). 
115. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 131. 
116 , , supra note 81, at xii. 
117. White, supra note 29, at 176. White continues by noting that  
[h]is principal interest was in facilitating the orderly processes of the American legal 
system. In this effort he made sure to keep his writing clean, bright, and lively: when a 
doctrinal   area   was   ‘in   hopeless   confusion’   Prosser’s   portrait   of   the   chaos   was   clear  
enough, and when administrative difficulties muddled the thrust of legal reforms, 
Prosser cataloged the difficulties with dispatch.  
Id. at 177. 
118. Id. at 176. 
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To a scholar like Prosser, who believed that the common law worked best 
when it was rationalized, refined, and harmonized, the energetic chaos of 
privacy law must have seemed far out of balance. Prosser sought to categorize 
the torts and to limit them to as small a number of discrete causes of action as 
possible. Looking at the mess of cases he found in the reports, Prosser sorted 
them into his three initial causes of action in 1941: intrusion, disclosure, and 
appropriation.119 When a handful of defamation-like cases defied this simple 
categorization, he recognized a fourth category—false light—in 1953.120 
But Prosser refused to allow privacy to mean more than his four torts. As 
noted below,121 he treated intentional infliction and breach of confidence as 
wholly unrelated torts. Moreover,   Prosser   refused   to   separate   the   “right   of  
publicity”  from  appropriation,  even  though  he  acknowledged  that  the  two  torts  
rested on radically different theories of injury: appropriation protecting the 
emotional interests of private persons from unwanted publicity, and publicity 
protecting the financial interests of celebrities from misappropriation of their 
intellectual property interest in their celebrity personae.122 Prosser’s   purpose  
here seems to have been to limit the growth of new conceptions of tort privacy 
into new causes of action and new contexts. He sought to limit the common 
law’s   innate   capacity   for   growth   in   this   area   by   tying   privacy   down lest its 
creative power upset other doctrines that represented the accumulated wisdom 
of generations.123 
Once he had limited the torts in these ways, Prosser used his influence as 
the leading torts scholar to ensure that his interpretation would be the one 
adopted by scholars and courts. In   the  wake  of  Prosser’s   scholarship   and   the  
Second Restatement of Torts in 1977, courts readily referred to the Restatement 
formulations of the privacy torts. Based on our familiarity with several hundred 
privacy tort cases from the 1960s to the present, the overwhelming majority of 
courts have adopted wholesale the specific language of either the Restatement 
or  Prosser’s  other  works   in  defining   the  privacy   torts.124 Although there have 
 
119 , supra note 37, at 1054–56.  
120  119 (1954) (publication 
of 1953 lectures). Clark Kelso surveys the cases Prosser classified in Privacy as false light and 
concludes   that   the   tort  “existed  only   in  Prosser’s  mind.” J. Clark Kelso, False Light Privacy: A 
Requiem, 32 . 783, 787 (1992). Kelso   claims   that   “Prosser incorrectly 
extracted  from  these  cases  a  principle  nowhere  to  be  found  in  the  cases  themselves.” Id. at 788. 
Moreover, he argues, 
[N]early all of these cases could be decided the same way without resort to a false light 
cause of action. The only cases where false light clearly changes the result are a few 
statute of limitations decisions, the results of which are explainable by judicial hostility 
to limitation periods. When the smoke has cleared, there exist only two decisions in 
which state appellate courts have affirmed pro- plaintiff judgments solely on the basis 
of false light privacy. 
Id. at 788. 
121. See infra Part II.C. 
122. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6, at 406–07. 
123. See id. at 422–23. 
124. For instance, the most recent state supreme court to adopt the privacy torts adopted 
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been a few deviations on occasion, for the most part, the Restatement 
formulations of the privacy torts are almost universally adopted, nearly 
verbatim.  
Although   the  privacy   torts  “complex”  was  Prosser’s  own   idea—a casual 
way to make some sense of the chaos of hundreds of divergent cases—it has 
hardened into the dominant conception of tort privacy. Today, the privacy torts 
stand at the four Prosser identified,125 and no new privacy torts have been 
created  since  Prosser’s  death.126 
Thus,   Prosser’s   Michigan   Lectures   and   1960   article   can   be   seen   as   a 
pivotal turning point in the evolution of privacy law. In the fifty years 
following  its  publication,  Warren  and  Brandeis’s  article  spawned  a  wide  variety  
of  statutory  and  common  law  causes  of  action  claiming  the  rubric  of  “privacy.” 
This wave of legislative and judicial activity responded creatively to protect the 
“right   to   be   let   alone”   and  gradually  gained   intensity. Depending on whether 
one   classifies   the   “right   of   publicity”   as   a   separate   tort   or   part   of   the tort of 
appropriation, at least four new torts were created during this period. This is a 
particularly large number considering that Warren and Brandeis never listed 
any specific torts in their article. In  the  fifty  years  between  Prosser’s  article  and  
today, the privacy torts remain fossilized largely as he left them.  
C. Omission 
Prosser’s   taxonomy   of   privacy   torts   consciously   made   some   significant  
omissions. By recognizing only four conceptions of tort privacy, Prosser 
excluded from his scheme a variety of other legal theories protecting related 
interests in personality, seclusion, or nondisclosure that courts had also 
recognized. Most notable among these omissions were the torts of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and breach of confidence. Examining how 
Prosser excluded these related actions from his treatment of privacy reveals a 
 
three   of   the   four   privacy   torts,   relying   on   Prosser’s   Restatement and the Warren and Brandeis 
article. Without  realizing  that  it  was  echoing  Prosser’s  own  arguments,  the  court  declined  to  adopt  
false light because it was “concerned   that   claims   under   false   light   are   similar   to   claims   of  
defamation, and to the extent that false light is more expansive than defamation, tension between 
this  tort  and  the  First  Amendment  is  increased.”  Lake  v.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 
235 (Minn. 1998). 
125. The right of publicity is an offshoot of the appropriation tort, first recognized as such 
in 1953. In Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), Judge 
Jerome  Frank  held   that   “in  addition   to  and   independent  of   that   right  of  privacy   (which   in  New  
York  derives  from  statute),  a  man  has  a  right  in  the  publicity  value  of  his  photograph.” Id. at 868. 
“The  appropriation  branch  of  the  right  of  privacy  is  invaded  by  an  injury  to  the  psyche”  whereas  
“the  right  of  publicity  is  infringed  by  an  injury  to  the  pocketbook.” ,
§ 5:61 (2000); see also id. at § 5:63. 
126. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial 
Dissemination of Personal Information, 65  1395,   1406   (1987)   (“Dean   Prosser’s  
categorization of privacy law into four torts, each with several indispensable elements has 
effectively frozen the development of privacy law despite the creation of new technologies that 
detrimentally  affect  individual  privacy.”).   
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great deal about the way in which he approached the privacy torts. 
Prosser’s  first  omission  from  the  privacy  torts  was  what  he  called  “mental  
distress”—now more commonly known as intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. This tort, as defined by the current Restatement, provides:  “One  who  
by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe 
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, 
and if bodily  harm  to  the  other  results  from  it,  for  such  bodily  harm.”127 
The intentional infliction and privacy torts share many related features. 
Both are intentional torts, both provide a remedy for emotional injury, both rest 
on normative conceptions of unreasonable antisocial behavior, both are usually 
effected   by   words   rather   than   actions,   and   both   are   products   of   tort   law’s  
expansion in the twentieth century to encompass psychological injuries rather 
than only physical injuries or injuries to property.128 Given these rather obvious 
similarities, one might think, therefore, that Prosser would have treated these 
related torts alike; indeed, many of the early tort cases are indistinguishable 
from intentional infliction claims.129  
Prosser himself recognized the significant overlap between intentional 
infliction and privacy.130 As he put it in the introduction to the intentional 
infliction   section   of   his   first   treatise,   “the   law   has   been   slow   to   accept   the  
interest in peace of mind as entitled to independent legal protection, even 
against intentional invasions. It has not been until recent years that there has 
been any general admission that the infliction of mental distress, standing 
alone,  may  serve  as  the  basis  for  an  action,  apart  from  any  other  tort.”131 
This passage bears a striking resemblance to the beginnings of the Warren 
and Brandeis article. Prosser, like Warren and Brandeis before him, told a story 
of   the   common   law’s   progress   from   the   protection   of   tangible   injuries   to  
intangible mental ones.132 One might think, then, given these similarities, that 
Prosser would have grouped the two torts together. However, he intentionally 
segregated them, placing them as far apart as possible in his treatises.133 
It is likely that Prosser acted this way because he was trying to protect the 
 
127   § 46 (1977).  
128.  175–76 (2008). 
129. See, e.g., Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary   Ass’n,   17   P.2d   535   (Colo.   1932);;  
Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 155 S.E. 194 (Ga. 1930); Young v. Western & A.R. Co., 148 S.E. 
414 (Ga. Ct. App. 1929); Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967 (Ky. 1927); Thompson v. Adelberg & 
Berman, Inc., 205 S.W. 558 (Ky. 1918); Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W. 849 (Ky. 1912); Kelley v. 
Post  Publ’g  Co.,  98  N.E.2d  286  (Mass.  1951);;  Barber  v.  Time,  Inc.,  159  S.W.2d  291  (Mo.  1942);;  
Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911).  
130. , , supra note 37, at 1054. 
131. Id. at 54. 
132. Compare id. with Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193.  
133. For example, in the first edition of the treatise, intentional infliction is contained in 
Chapter   2,   “Intentional   Interference   with   the   Person,”   starting   on   page 54, while privacy is 
contained  in  the  final  “Miscellaneous”  Chapter  21,  starting  on  page 1050. , 
supra note 37. 
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intentional infliction tort from being swallowed up by privacy, in the same way 
he later feared that false light might replace defamation and appropriation 
might overwhelm intellectual property.134 Prosser had special interest in the 
“new  tort”  of  intentional infliction, as it was one of the first areas of tort law in 
which he had made an impact.135 He lamented that a number of cases that were 
clearly intentional infliction cases had been wrongly lumped into the privacy 
category, including the famous Brents v. Morgan case discussed above.136 
Indeed, in his discussion of the privacy torts, Prosser observed that both torts 
were   part   of   the   “larger   problem   of   the   protection   of   peace   of  mind   against  
unreasonable  disturbance.”137 He  added  his  hope  that  “[w]hen  the  ‘new  tort’  of  
intentional infliction of mental suffering becomes fully developed and receives 
general recognition, the great majority of the privacy cases may very possibly 
be  absorbed  into  it.”138 
A   second   notable   omission   from   Prosser’s   taxonomy   was   the   tort of 
breach of confidence. This tort provides a remedy whenever a person owes a 
duty of confidentiality to another and breaches that duty.139 The breach of 
confidence tort grew out of the same foundational English case as the Warren 
and Brandeis privacy torts—Prince Albert v. Strange. In Prince Albert, a 
printer was barred from exhibiting a catalogue of etchings entrusted to him by 
Prince   Albert,   Queen   Victoria’s   Prince   Consort,   on   grounds   of   breach   of  
confidence and literary property.140 Although it involved famous royal 
plaintiffs, the case rested on established legal principles. Indeed, in 1890, when 
Warren and Brandeis wrote, the common law provided much stronger 
precedent for breach of confidence than for any of the four privacy torts that 
emerged from Warren  and  Brandeis’s  article.141 
The breach of confidence tort developed more fully in England than in 
America. English law rejected the Warren and Brandeis privacy torts, yet used 
Prince Albert v. Strange to develop confidentiality law. In England, breach of 
confidence grew into a robust tort that protects many of the same interests as 
Prosser’s   privacy   torts. In America, the confidentiality tort remains a minor 
doctrine that has started to blossom only in the past few decades. Nevertheless, 
several American cases had recognized a breach of confidence tort before 
Prosser. For example, the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded in 1920 that 
 
134. See infra notes 77–80 and accompanying text. 
135. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering, supra note 49. Craig Joyce calls 
this  article  one  of  the  “landmarks  in  the  development  of  both  of  the  literature  of  torts  and  of  the  
law  itself.” Joyce, supra note 40, at 852.  
136 , , supra note 37, at 61 (citing Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 
967 (Ky. 1927)). 
137. Id. at 1054.  
138. Id. 
139. Richards & Solove, Privacy’s  Other  Path, supra note 2, at 156–57. 
140. Prince Albert v. Strange (1849) 64 Eng. Rep. 293, 295 (Ch.). 
141. Richards & Solove, Privacy’s  Other  Path, supra note 2, at 133–44. 
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because   physicians   were   “bound”   by   “professional   honor   and   the   ethics   of  
[their]  high  profession”  to  maintain  patient  confidentiality,  a  “wrongful  breach  
of such confidence, and a betrayal of such trust, would give rise to a civil action 
for  damages  naturally  flowing  from  such  wrong.”142 And in 1930 the Georgia 
Supreme Court recognized a confidentiality action against a hospital that had 
leaked a photograph of a deformed child.143 Other cases reached similar 
results.144 
Although the breach of confidence tort existed in America while Prosser 
was writing, he opted not to include it. As with the separation of privacy from 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, this was a conscious and deliberate 
choice. For instance, in the first edition of his treatise, he noted that Warren and 
Brandeis had relied on English breach of confidence cases to support the 
proposition that they rested on the broader ground that a right to privacy against 
the   press   was   “essential   to   the   protection   of   private   individuals   against   the  
unjustified  infliction  of  mental  pain  and  distress.”145 Prosser also attempted to 
distinguish the confidentiality cases from privacy at the end of the chapter: 
The right of privacy, as such, is to be distinguished from liability found 
upon the breach of some confidential or fiduciary relation, as where a 
photographer violates his implied contract by publishing a picture 
which he has been employed to take, or a student publishes the notes 
taken   in   a   professor’s   course. In such cases there may of course be 
liability for publications which would otherwise be entirely 
legitimate.146 
Though Prosser gave no citations, the hypothetical situations he describes are 
the facts of two seminal English breach of confidence cases. The photographer 
scenario is identical to Pollard v. Photographic Co.,147 and   the   student’s  
publication  of  a  professor’s  notes  corresponds  closely  to  the  facts  in  Abernethy 
v. Hutchinson.148 Both of these cases were key elements of Warren and 
Brandeis’s  privacy  argument.149 
 
142. Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (Neb. 1920). 
143. Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 155 S.E. 194 (Ga. 1930).  
144. See Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W. 849 (Ky. 1912) (finding photographer breached 
implied contract when he made extra  copies  of  photos  of  father’s  dead  babies);;  Smith  v.  Driscoll,  
162 P. 572 (Wash. 1917) (assuming doctors can be liable for breaching the confidences of their 
patients while testifying in court). 
145. , , supra note 37, at 1051. 
146. Id. at 1062. 
147. (1888) 40 Ch. D. 345. In Pollard, a photographer was hired to take a picture, but then 
retained the negatives and used them to make Christmas cards. The client whose likeness was 
reproduced and sold without her consent sued and won under  a  common  law  action  for  “breach  of  
contract  and  breach  of  faith.” Id. at 353. 
148. (1825) 47 Eng. Rep. 1313 (Ch.). In Abernethy, a medical student attended a series of 
lectures by a distinguished surgeon and took notes. He then submitted transcripts of these lectures 
for publication in a medical journal. The  court  granted  an   injunction  of   the  publication  “on   the  
ground  of  breach  of  contract  or  of  trust.” Id. at 1317. 
149. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 207–10. Later editions of the treatise replaced the 
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 Although Prosser never gave breach of confidence separate treatment in 
his work, he cited breach of confidence cases freely where it served his privacy 
arguments. A good example of this is his 1960 article, in which the discussion 
of the disclosure tort is replete with references to American confidentiality 
cases. But although many of these cases have similar or identical fact patterns 
to disclosure tort cases, Prosser repeatedly distinguished them. For example, 
while arguing that the disclosure tort requires widespread publicity to be 
actionable, Prosser noted that communication of facts to an employer, another 
individual, or even a small group is not an invasion of privacy and is only 
tortious  if  “there  is  some  breach  of  contract,  trust  or  confidential  relation  which  
will  afford  an  independent  basis  for  relief.”150 Citations to confidentiality cases 
run throughout his treatment of the disclosure tort,151 but Prosser gives no 
reason why breach of confidence should not be included in his complex of four 
“loosely  related”  torts. 
Prosser also included these cases in the third edition of his torts treatise in 
1964.152 In the fourth edition of the treatise, published in 1971, Prosser cited 
several breach of confidentiality cases when discussing the public disclosure 
tort. He described the cases not as establishing an independent tort but merely 
as an exception to one of the elements of the public disclosure tort. He noted 
the general requirement that the public disclosure be widely disseminated in 
order   for   there   to   be   liability   under   the   tort   “unless   there   is   some   breach   of  
contract, trust or confidential relation which will afford an independent basis 
for   relief.”153 The cases he cited, however, were not public disclosure tort 
cases—they never mentioned the tort at all.  
To be fair to Prosser, he might have been attempting to focus only on 
those  privacy   torts   that   emerged  directly   from  Warren   and  Brandeis’s  article. 
Nevertheless, this  would  not  extend  to  Prosser’s  exclusion  of  the  confidentiality  
tort from the Restatement. Despite this defense, it represents a rather narrow 
vision   of   the   legacy   of   Warren   and   Brandeis’s   article. Moreover,   Prosser’s  
argument that breach of confidence is a separate tort from his complex of four 
privacy torts seems unconvincing. When Warren and Brandeis relied on 
confidentiality cases to support their general claim in The Right to Privacy, and 
Prosser recognized the similarities between confidentiality and privacy, there 
would seem to be no reason to exclude breach of confidence. Confidentiality 
shares more in common with the disclosure tort than, for instance, intrusion, 
appropriation, or the subcategory of appropriation cases that constitute the 
 
English case hypotheticals with citations to equivalent American cases. See , 
, supra note 37, at 644 n.29 (citing Holmes v. Underwood & Underwood, 233 
N.Y.S. 153 (N.Y. App. Div. 1929); Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (Pa. C.P. 1940)). 
150. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6, at 393–94 & n.96 (citing Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 
N.W. 831 (Neb. 1920)). 
151. See, e.g., id. at nn. 82, 83, 88, 96, 109, 111, 112.  
152 , supra note 81, at 807 & n.97. 
153. Id. at 810 & n.84.  
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“right  of  publicity.”  
Prosser’s   construction   of   the   privacy   tort   cases   as   separate   from  
intentional infliction and breach of confidence is curious given the interests and 
precedents these torts share with the four privacy torts he enumerated. These 
exclusions may  have  rendered  the  privacy  torts  more  amenable  to  Prosser’s  tidy  
doctrinal boxes, but it also robbed privacy of much of the vitality it had 
possessed prior to his doctrinal pruning. As we discuss next, this decision has 
limited  tort  privacy’s  ability  to  evolve in novel and potentially useful ways. 
D. Conceptualization 
In setting forth a taxonomy of privacy torts, Prosser played an important 
role not just in the doctrinal development of privacy law but in its conceptual 
development as well. Prosser was a doctrinalist par excellence, in that he wrote 
scholarship that systematized, organized, and explained doctrine. He was also a 
legal realist insofar as he believed judges made law (sometimes influenced by 
scholars). In this respect, Prosser can be seen as responding to the crisis of 
indeterminacy found in the writings of Leon Green, Lon Fuller, and others with 
what  G.E.  White  has  called  the  “Consensus  School”  of  torts.154 Prosser agreed 
with the more radical realists in rejecting the formal rule-based approach to the 
law of legal classicism, but his response was that the common law, if subjected 
to close scrutiny, could reveal itself to be not only just but also rational and 
predictable.155 Prosser’s   methodology—the analysis and restatement of the 
holdings of thousands of cases—sought to demonstrate just this fact. According 
to  Craig  Joyce,  “he  treated  the  ‘doctrines’  of  tort  law  as  amalgams  of  principles  
and processes, each of which could be reduced to a relatively simple formula. 
Each formula distilled the aggregate wisdom   of   countless   cases.”156  As a 
realist, Prosser recognized that this wisdom was man-made, but as a doctrinalist 
with faith in the common law, he believed that it was rational and usually for 
the better. 
Prosser defined his relationship to privacy as that of a passive reporter, 
noting the development of the law and offering a few reactions to it. He 
understated the extent to which his own hand was actively shaping the law. 
Because of his skeptical normative stance toward the privacy torts, he was not 
interested in helping to structure the law so it could develop more robustly. He 
appeared instead to view the privacy torts as a rather thoughtless and incoherent 
set   of   unwanted   doctrines   growing   out   of  Warren   and   Brandeis’s   article. In 
Privacy, he frequently noted how the privacy torts deviated from more 
traditional torts in ways he found problematic. Privacy law was a set of weeds 
 
154. See , supra note 29, at 85 (citing , 
 (1931)); Leon Green, The Duty Problem In Negligence Cases (Pt. 1), 28 
 1014, 1016 (1929); ,  (1940).  
155. Joyce, supra note 40, at 856–57. 
156. Id. at 855–56. 
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intruding into the more well-manicured garden of tort law—in which Prosser 
himself was the head gardener. 
Although Prosser likely did not intend to articulate a conception of 
privacy, his taxonomic ordering of the doctrine served exactly that function, 
especially given that the theoretical landscape for conceptualizing privacy was 
relatively barren at the time.157 Prosser’s  foray  into the subject of privacy was 
the most important scholarly attention it had received since Warren and 
Brandeis   wrote   in   1890,   but   Prosser’s   conception   of   privacy   was   far   less  
dynamic than that of Warren and Brandeis. 
Warren and Brandeis had argued that the common law protected privacy 
via  the  “right  to  be  let  alone,”  an  overarching  principle  in  the  common  law: 
[T]he protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, 
expressed through the medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it 
consists in preventing publication, is merely an instance of the 
enforcement of the more general right of the individual to be let alone. 
It is like the right not be assaulted or beaten, the right not be 
imprisoned, the right not to be maliciously prosecuted, the right not to 
be defamed.158 
They had explained how various other legal protections were manifestations of 
this   principle,   and   argued   that   the  protection  of   “inviolate  personality”   rather  
than  property  was  what  justified  the  law’s  protection  against  the  publication of 
personal writings.159 
Courts used the broad principle Warren and Brandeis had articulated—the 
“right  to  be  let  alone”—to fashion the various tort remedies in the first half of 
the twentieth century. Although  the  “right  to  be  let  alone”  was  flawed  because 
it was overinclusive and vague,160 it was nevertheless quite fertile, for its 
breadth germinated countless new torts to redress a variety of related yet 
distinct harms.  
Prosser,  however,  saw  the   law  developing  out  of  Warren  and  Brandeis’s  
article as a discordant gaggle of cases. He noted that the law of privacy had 
 
157. A major wave of theorizing about privacy emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
A 1966 symposium in Law and Contemporary Problems contained extensive theoretical 
discussion about the concept of privacy, see Symposium, Privacy, 31  
251–435 (1966), as did a 1971 collection of essays in Nomos, see (J. Ronald 
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971). Two of the most influential books about privacy—
Alan  Westin’s  Privacy and Freedom and  Arthur  Miller’s The Assault on Privacy—appeared in 
1967 and 1971, respectively. See , (1971);
, (1967). 
158. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205. 
159. Id.  
160. For  a  critique  of  the  “right  to  be  let  alone”  formulation,  see   ,
, supra note 128, at 15–18; see also ,
 7   (1988)   (“If  privacy   simply  meant   ‘being   let   alone,’   any   form  of  
offensive or harmful conduct directed toward another person could be characterized as a violation 
of personal privacy. A punch in the nose would be a privacy invasion as much as a peep in the 
bedroom.”). 
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four different kinds of invasion but which had virtually nothing in common.161 
Prosser’s   characterization   of   the   privacy   torts   detached   them   from   their  
foundational  principle  of  the  “right  to  be  let  alone”  and  reconceptualized  them  
as four discrete kinds of injury. Under  Prosser’s  taxonomy,  the  privacy  torts  did  
not have any coherence or any reason to be linked together other than the 
historical contingency that they were inspired by Warren and Brandeis’s  
article.162 
The   most   significant   early   response   to   Prosser’s   approach   was   a  
conceptual critique by legal scholar Edward Bloustein. Bloustein argued that 
Prosser’s   understanding   of   privacy   was   splintered   and   incoherent. He 
contended that Prosser transformed   assaults   on   privacy   “into   a   species   of  
defamation, infliction of mental distress and misappropriation. If Dean Prosser 
is   correct,   there   is   no   ‘new   tort’   of   invasion  of   privacy,   there   are   rather   only  
new   ways   of   committing   ‘old   torts.’”163 Bloustein suggested that privacy 
invasions were not four distinct interests with little in common, for they all 
shared   a   similar   trait:   They   were   “demeaning   to   individuality”164 and   “an  
affront  to  personal  dignity.”165 
In a response to Bloustein, Prosser noted in his treatise   that   some  “have  
occasionally   contended   that   the   ‘right   to   privacy’   represents   a   considerably  
broader principle than is encompassed by the four types of invasion set forth in 
the  last  four  cases.”166 He responded by concluding that all of the privacy cases 
fit squarely into his four categories. “This   is  not   to   say   that   there  will  not  be  
other kinds of invasion of privacy, recognized under the Constitution or at 
common  law,”  he  wrote, ”[b]ut  what   they  will  be,   if   they  come,   remains   thus  
far a matter of the personal penchants of professors rather than court 
recognition.”167 Prosser thus held steadfastly to his view that his four torts 
protected a group of totally unrelated interests. 
Prosser’s   view   that   the   privacy   torts   were   unrelated   can   certainly   be  
justified. “Dignity”   and   “individuality”   are   broad   and   vague,   not   much  
narrower   than  Warren   and   Brandeis’s   “right   to   be   let   alone”   and   “inviolate  
personality.” There are countless things that assail individuality, dignity, or 
personality, and these conceptions of privacy suffer from overinclusiveness.  
Although Prosser may have wisely avoided basing his theory of privacy 
on such broad conceptions, he was perhaps too quick to conclude that the 
privacy torts were entirely unrelated. As one of us has argued, privacy should 
not be understood as one thing; it is a pluralistic concept involving protections 
 
161. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6, at 389.  
162. Prosser was himself explicit on this point. See id. at 422. 
163. Bloustein, supra note 5, at 996. 
164. Id. at 973.  
165. Id.  
166 , , supra note 94, at 943.  
167 Id.  
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against many different kinds of problems.168 These problems are distinct, but 
they are nevertheless related, even if they lack an overarching and driving 
principle. Although there may be no way to reduce privacy to a common 
denominator, the alternative need not be a chaos of discrepant things. As 
Ludwig   Wittgenstein   observed,   some   things   may   be   related   via   “family  
resemblances”—“a  complicated  network  of  similarities  overlapping and criss-
crossing.”169 Prosser’s  view  of  his  categories  as  having  “nothing   in  common”  
too quickly dismisses the privacy torts as an uncontrolled and incoherent 
growth.  
Because he rejected looking for any connections between the different 
privacy torts and refused any attempt to give them more conceptual coherence, 
Prosser provided no direction for the further development of the law besides the 
continued entrenchment of the four categories he identified. Before Prosser, 
courts looked to Warren and Brandeis’s   article   and   examined   whether  
particular   harms   fell   under   the   very   broad   principle   of   the   “right   to   be   let  
alone.” After Prosser, courts looked to whether a particular harm fit into one of 
Prosser’s   four  categories. Since Prosser eschewed any sense of connection or 
coherence for his categories, he left courts no conceptual guidance to assist in 
creating new categories or in shaping the torts in new directions.  
It is not surprising that Prosser failed to devote more time toward 
conceptualizing what privacy was and where it might be going because he was 
openly skeptical about privacy. In the concluding pages of his 1960 article, he 
criticized   the   law  of  privacy  as  having  “expanded  by  slow  degrees   to   invade,  
overlap, and encroach upon a number of other fields.”170 After warning of the 
“dangers”  of  the  expansion  of  privacy  law,  Prosser  stated: 
This is not to say that the developments in the law of privacy are 
wrong. Undoubtedly they have been supported by genuine public 
demand and lively public feeling, and made necessary by real abuses 
on the part of defendants who have brought it all upon themselves. It is 
to say rather that it is high time that we realize what we are doing, and 
give some consideration to the question of where, if anywhere, we are 
to call a halt.171 
Prosser crafted his taxonomy with an eye to halting the development of 
privacy, which he felt was growing too rapidly and too wildly. His comments at 
the end of Privacy suggest   that   he   wanted   to   limit   privacy’s   future  
development. In this he succeeded. For   all   its   flaws,  Warren   and  Brandeis’s  
principle   of   the   “right   to   be   let   alone”   was   at   least   coherent   and   capable   of  
inspiring a wide body of legal development. Prosser’s   characterization   of  
 
168. See , supra note 128.  
169. See id. at 42 (quoting  §§ 
65–67 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1958)).  
170. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 6, at 422. 
171. Id. at 423.  
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privacy as consisting of four categories of tort with no connections and no 
coherence provided little guidance for future growth. If privacy was as Prosser 
conceptualized it, then it had no direction. It was entirely empty, with no theory 
about what kinds of wrongs should be redressed by tort law.  
Prosser’s  view of privacy as an empty and dangerous concept affected not 
just which torts he recognized as privacy torts but also how he defined them. 
Consider, for example, the appropriation tort. Prosser characterized the injury 
protected by the appropriation tort as   “not   so   much   a   mental   [one]   as   a  
proprietary   one.”172 Such a characterization severs any link between the tort 
and  Warren   and   Brandeis’s   article,   which   emphatically   stressed   that   privacy  
was a mental injury and that property rights were inadequate to address the 
harm. The early cases involving the tort of appropriation understood it as 
protecting individuals from being exploited when their identities were used by 
others without their consent. In Pavesich,173 for example, the Georgia Supreme 
Court recognized a privacy   action   when   a   company   used   the   plaintiff’s  
photograph without permission in a life insurance advertisement. Central to the 
court’s  conclusion  was  its  belief  that: 
[t]he right of one to exhibit himself to the public at all proper times, in 
all proper places, and in a proper manner is embraced within the right 
of personal liberty. The right to withdraw from the public gaze at such 
times as a person may see fit, when his presence in public is not 
demanded by any rule of law, is also embraced within the right of 
personal liberty.174 
The court also reasoned that the harm to the plaintiff consisted of the taking 
away   of   his   “liberty”   and   that   “he   is   for   the   time   being   under   the   control   of  
another.”175 Such an understanding of the tort shows how it emerged from 
Warren   and  Brandeis’s   article   even   though   it  was   not   primarily   the   tort   they  
had in mind. In  contrast,  Prosser’s  view  of  the  tort  has  no  connection  to  Warren  
or Brandeis’s and has no apparent relationship to the other privacy torts.176 
Prosser’s   characterization of appropriation had a dramatic effect on the 
tort. According   to   Jonathan   Kahn,   the   “early   association   of   appropriation  
claims with such intangible, non-commensurable attributes of the self as 
dignity  and   the   integrity  of  one’s  persona  seems   to  have been lost, or at least 
misplaced, as property-based conceptions of the legal status of identity have 
 
172. Id. at 406. 
173. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
174. Id. at 70.  
175. Id. at 80. 
176. As   Robert   Post   argues,   “The   descriptive   privacy   employed   by   the   second  
Restatement’s  definition  of  appropriation  is  consistent  with  a  property  conception  of  the  tort,  but  
incompatible  with  a  remedial  focus  on  indignity  and  mental  distress.” Robert C. Post, Rereading 
Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation, 41  647, 674 
(1991).  
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come  to  the  fore.”177 
One can never know what privacy law might have become had Prosser 
thought and wrote differently about privacy. Compared to the vitality and 
creativity   of  Warren   and  Brandeis,   Prosser’s   concept   of   privacy  was   far   less  
visionary. It was backward-looking rather than forward-looking.  
Of course, Prosser was not the sole cause of this dramatic change in 
privacy law. It was the product of the numerous courts that adopted his 
taxonomy and stopped engaging in the dynamic creative activity that had 
preceded it. There  is  no  way  to  know  if  the  courts  were  persuaded  by  Prosser’s  
view that the privacy torts lacked any meaningful relationship with each other. 
Most likely, courts turned to his approach because his taxonomy was a useful 
tool in such a burgeoning and complex area of law, he was so prominent and 
authoritative on tort law, and he took such vigorous efforts to have courts adopt 
his legal formulations. Regardless of the reason, the result was that courts 
embraced  Prosser’s  account  of  the  torts,  which  was  not  nearly  as  generative  as  
Warren  and  Brandeis’s  principle  of  the  “right  to  be  let  alone.”  
III. 
THE FUTURE OF TORT PRIVACY 
A. The Limits of the Privacy Torts 
The  story  of  Prosser’s  privacy  torts  is  thus  oddly  one  of  both  great  success  
and stunning failure. Nearly every state recognizes at least one form of the 
privacy torts by common law or statute.178  As the U.S. Supreme Court declared 
in 1975,  “the  century  has  experienced  a  strong  tide  running  in  favor  of  the  so-
called  right  of  privacy.”179 Citing  Prosser’s   torts   treatise,   the  Court  noted   that  
the privacy torts were firmly and widely established,180 and it proclaimed that 
the   “right   of   privacy”   has   “impressive   credentials.”181 In this regard, the 
privacy torts are quite a success. Sprouting from a law review article, they 
developed within a century into a well-established body of nationally-
 
177. Jonathan Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light: Publicity Rights and the Eclipse of 
the Tort of Appropriation of Identity, 17  213, 223 (1999). A new tort, 
known  as   the  “right  of  publicity,”  has  emerged   to   redress   violations  of  property   rights   in  one’s  
name or likeness. See, e.g., Oliver R. Goodenough, Go   Fish:   Evaluating   the   Restatement’s  
Formulation of the Law of Publicity, 47  709 (1996); Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right 
of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 
46  853 (1995); supra note 125 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of 
Publicity, 19  203 (1954). According to Thomas McCarthy, 
“Simplistically  put,  while  the  appropriation  branch  of  the  right  of  privacy  is  invaded  by  an  injury  
to   the  psyche,   the   right   of  publicity   is   infringed  by  an   injury   to   the   pocket  book.”  
supra note 125, at § 5:61. 
178. See, e.g., supra note 104, at 77. 
179. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 488 (1975).  
180. Id.  
181. Id. at 489. 
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recognized law. Prosser played an important role in moving this process along.  
But the tale of these torts is also one of disappointment. Tort law has not 
emerged as the leading protector of privacy. According  to  Rodney  Smolla,  “If  
privacy law were a stock, its performance over the last century would not be 
deemed impressive. It has been a consistently poor achiever, barely keeping up 
with  inflation.”182 Privacy tort cases have proven quite difficult for plaintiffs to 
win, and the torts have not kept pace with contemporary privacy problems. Just 
as he has had a large share  in  the  privacy  torts’  successes,  Prosser  bears  much  
of the blame for their failure. 
The privacy torts have proven disappointing in at least two ways. First, 
they have not provided the kind of protection against the media that Warren 
and Brandeis envisioned. Second, they have not adapted to new privacy 
problems such as the extensive collection, use, and disclosure of personal 
information by businesses.  
Regarding the applicability of the torts to the media, the predominant tort 
addressing the disclosure of information by the media is the tort of public 
disclosure of private facts. The disclosure tort is severely limited in many 
respects,   particularly   by   requiring   that   the   disclosure   give   “publicity”   to  
information that is not newsworthy. In cases involving media giving publicity 
to personal information, the newsworthiness element results in many cases 
being dismissed. According  to  Jonathan  Mintz,  “plaintiffs’  privacy  rights  rarely  
prevail  over  the  public’s  interests,  rendering  the  limitation  on  the  scope of the 
public interest essentially theoretical and leaving plaintiffs with rare 
success.”183 A number of courts are very deferential to the media on 
newsworthiness, essentially concluding that if the media chooses to publish a 
story, then this is the most viable evidence of its newsworthiness.184 In the 
words   of   one   court,   “what   is   newsworthy   is   primarily   a   function   of   the  
publisher,  not  the  courts.”185 Such an approach virtually nullifies the tort in the 
media context.186 
These problems are becoming more acute as more individuals disseminate 
information through blogging and social networking technologies. Today, 
anybody has the power to broadcast information to a worldwide audience, 
creating new issues for privacy law to confront. Warren and Brandeis worried 
about an overly-sensational press, but the press in 1890 was relatively confined 
 
182. Rodney A. Smolla, Accounting for the Slow Growth of American Privacy Law, 27 
 289, 289–90 (2002).  
183. Jonathan B. Mintz, The  Remains  of  Privacy’s  Disclosure  Tort:  An  Exploration  of  the  
Private Domain, 55  425, 446 (1996) (citation omitted). 
184. See Wagner   v.   Fawcett   Publ’n.,   307  F.2d   409,   410   (7th  Cir.  1962);;   Jenkins   v.  Dell  
Publ’g.  Co.,  251  F.2d  447,  451–52 (3d Cir. 1958); Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. 
Supp. 957, 960–61 (D. Minn. 1948). 
185. Heath v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1145, 1149 n.9 (S.D. Fla. 1990).  
186. Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against 
Disclosure, 53  L.J. 967, 1000–08 (2003). 
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to a select group of entities. Today,   in   comparison,   the   “media”   consists   not  
only of the mainstream press (as well as television and radio) but also of the 
hundreds of millions of people around the world who can disseminate text, 
images, and video from their mobile phones and personal computers. The 
privacy torts have not been able to deal with the traditional media, and this 
burgeoning new media is raising the stakes and posing even greater challenges. 
Beyond problems addressing the media, the privacy torts have struggled 
to address the collection, use, and dissemination of personal information in 
computer   databases.   As   Julie   Cohen   aptly   observed,   “[I]t   is   becoming  
increasingly clear that the common law invasion of privacy torts will not help 
to  contain  the  destruction  of  informational  privacy.”187 
The tort of intrusion, the most likely candidate to regulate the collection of 
information, faces several hurdles. Much of the compilation of data occurs 
from information that is in the public domain, and courts have concluded that 
collecting   such   data   is   not   an   invasion   into   a   person’s   “solitude”   or  
“seclusion.”188 
Several privacy torts—public disclosure, intrusion, and false light—
require that   the   privacy   invasion   be   “highly   offensive   to   a   reasonable  
person.”189 Much of the information that is gathered, used, and disseminated by 
businesses is done so in bits and pieces. Moreover, it often involves relatively 
innocuous information that fails to be offensive enough in each instance to rise 
to   the   level   of   “highly   offensive.” Gathering   information   such   as   a   person’s  
unlisted phone number, for example, is not sufficient to give rise to an action 
for intrusion.190 In Shibley v. Time, Inc.,191 a magazine publisher sold its 
customer subscription list to advertisers. The court concluded that the sale of 
the   lists  did  not  “cause  mental  suffering,  shame  or  humiliation   to  a  person  of  
ordinary  sensibilities.”192 
The tort of appropriation has also failed to address the collection, use, and 
dissemination of personal data. In Dwyer v. American Express Co.,193 the court 
concluded that plaintiffs lacked an appropriation claim against American 
Express  for  selling  their  names  to  merchants  because  “an  individual  name  has  
value  only  when  it  is  associated  with  one  of  defendants’  lists. Defendants create 
value by categorizing and aggregating these names. Furthermore,  defendants’  
practices do not deprive any of the cardholders of any value their individual 
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names  may  possess.”194 
A broader reason why the privacy torts have failed to address 
contemporary problems stems from the way courts conceptualize privacy. With 
regard to the public disclosure tort and the intrusion upon seclusion tort, courts 
have relied upon antiquated and narrow understandings of privacy. Many 
courts have viewed privacy as non-existent if the information in question has 
already been exposed to the public or to others.195 As one court has put it, 
“There  can  be  no  privacy  in  that  which  is  already  public.”196 The problem with 
this view of privacy is that information is only rarely completely public or 
completely private. The disclosure tort lacks an intermediate stage between the 
poles   of   “public”   and   “private.” People expose information with varying 
expectations of the extent and nature of its future exposure. When they go 
about their daily activities, most people expect not to have the information 
about them recorded, compiled, or widely disseminated. In urban settings, 
people expect to be seen and heard by others, but they expect anonymity—that 
those perceiving them will not care or remember. Even in a smaller town, 
people might expect particular activities to be known by particular people, but 
this information would be splintered among various individuals. People likely 
do not expect it to be aggregated together into a comprehensive dossier.  
The current privacy torts have struggled in recognizing more nuanced 
understandings of privacy in terms of levels of accessibility of information. 
Combining disparate data together or taking inaccessible information and 
disseminating it much more widely are both significant incursions on privacy. 
Nevertheless, with the simplistic conception of privacy that many courts still 
adopt, privacy becomes an all-or-nothing affair, something that makes privacy 
virtually   impossible   in   today’s  world  where   it   is   increasingly   difficult   (if   not  
impossible) to keep much information completely hidden away. 
Another way in which current tort-based conceptions of privacy are 
limited is in their failure to recognize confidentiality. As we have argued 
extensively elsewhere, American law has been slow to recognize 
confidentiality.197 As one court famously declared, if a person shares a secret 
with   another   person,   “he   would   necessarily   assume   the   risk   that   a friend or 
acquaintance  in  whom  he  had  confided  might  breach  the  confidence.”198 
Indeed, Lior Strahilevitz suggests that even sharing a secret with a large 
group  of  people  should  not  spell  doom  to  one’s  claim  of  privacy.199 He argues 
that information contained within   one’s   social   network   still   remains  
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functionally private because it is not likely to spread beyond those 
boundaries.200 But information is frequently shared with a few trusted 
confidantes—doctors and lawyers, and also spouses, lovers, and friends—under 
legitimate expectations that these secrets should not be shared with all the 
world. And  we  believe  that  confidentiality’s  focus  on  trust  and  relationships  has  
the potential to provide better solutions to these problems.201 Courts, however, 
continue to struggle with the issue and have failed to provide any coherent 
approach for dealing with these questions.202 
These are just a few examples of the ways in which judicial conceptions 
of privacy have hamstrung the effectiveness of the privacy torts. New 
technologies and methods for collecting and disseminating information have 
changed how people can modulate their privacy, but courts appear stuck with 
notions of privacy more appropriate for the first half of the twentieth century. 
The failure of the privacy torts to adapt to contemporary privacy problems is 
due, in part, to their lack of dynamism. In many ways, the privacy torts are like 
relics from the mid-twentieth century. The existing torts stopped being 
malleable and remain too rigid to serve as a good fit for today’s   Information  
Age. And no new privacy torts have arisen to address the burgeoning problems 
caused by new technologies.  
B. Reigniting Tort Privacy 
Is tort law malleable and flexible enough to grow to meet the demands of 
protecting privacy in the twenty-first century? Although tort law certainly has 
many limits and cannot be the sole protector of privacy, it can be strengthened 
significantly. Tort law has the seeds within it to grow to respond to many 
contemporary privacy problems caused by the collection, use, and 
dissemination of personal data. Several scholars have proposed expansions of 
the privacy torts to address contemporary privacy problems. For example, 
Danielle Citron proposes strict liability for companies that leak data.203 Sarah 
Ludington argues for the creation of a common law tort based on the Fair 
Information Practices.204 Jessica Litman suggests a breach of trust tort when 
companies misuse information.205 
Such innovations in tort law have not occurred. The lack of growth and 
development in tort law—both common law and statutory—cannot be 
attributed entirely to Prosser. Nevertheless, prior to Prosser, the landscape of 
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the tort law of privacy was one of vigorous growth and experimentation; after 
Prosser, tort privacy became rigid and static.  
How should tort law evolve to address current privacy problems? We 
offer a few suggestions. First, tort law must rethink antiquated understandings 
of privacy. As discussed above, the law must abandon the binary, all-or-nothing 
approach toward privacy in favor of a more modern and nuanced understanding 
of the gradations between purely public and purely private. 
Tort law should take into account the social contexts in which information 
is shared between individuals, and the expectations (reasonable or not) that the 
individuals have about the shared information. To do so, tort law should expand 
upon the breach of confidence tort, making it more robust like its English 
counterpart.206 This process is already underway, but the confidentiality tort has 
been held back in part because it was left out of the spotlight given to the other 
privacy torts. Little recognized and hardly known, the tort languished in 
obscurity until quite recently. It did not appear in many privacy cases in which 
it might have applied probably because so few knew much about it.207 But 
confidentiality has a great deal of promise. For instance, because it is inherently 
about the limited entrustment of information to others, it is better able to cope 
with the reality that information is only rarely completely  “public”  or  “private.” 
This  is  just  one  example  of  the  ways  in  which  Prosser’s  narrow  conception  of  
tort law continues to affect the current state of the law. 
Second, tort law must come to a more sophisticated conception of harm. 
In the opening pages of their article, Warren and Brandeis argued that the law 
had long been developing a broader recognition of harm. They noted that while 
the law originally protected against more tangible and physical kinds of harms, 
in more modern times, the law was evolving to recognize harms of a more 
intangible nature—harms  to  one’s  psyche  and  emotions.208 
Today,   courts   still   view   emotional   harms   “with   suspicion”   because   of  
“concerns  over  genuineness,  reliability,  and  the  specter  of  unlimited  liability  for  
trivial losses.”209 Courts often are dismissive of privacy harms because they 
lack a physical component. For example, courts have struggled to recognize 
harm from leaked or improperly disseminated data.210 Courts can readily 
understand the harm caused by the disclosure of a naked photograph of a 
person, but they struggle in locating a harm when non-embarrassing data is 
disclosed or leaked. A broader understanding of harm is needed in order for the 
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privacy torts to apply to the extensive gathering, dissemination, and use of 
information by various businesses and organizations.211 
Third, courts must develop a better understanding of the relationship 
between free speech and tort-based privacy remedies. Partly  due   to  Prosser’s  
influence, many modern courts consider privacy and free speech to be always 
in direct conflict.212 While tort actions against the press based upon emotional 
injury or hurt feelings raise important First Amendment issues, these are but a 
subset of the cases in which tort privacy can apply. Unlike actions against the 
press, actions in the database context raise far fewer First Amendment issues.213 
And as we have argued recently, the breach of confidence tort only rarely 
clashes with the First Amendment.214 
Fourth, courts must recognize new duties and new sources of duties in tort 
law. One relatively recent case suggests a more robust role for tort law in 
addressing the problems caused by computer databases. In Remsburg v. 
Docusearch, Inc.,215 a man named Liam Youens obtained data about Amy 
Lynn Boyer from a database company called Docusearch, which supplied him 
with her Social Security number and work address. Youens then went to 
Boyer’s   workplace   and   murdered   her. Boyer’s   estate   sued   Docusearch,  
claiming  it  was  negligent  in  giving  Youens  Boyer’s  personal  information. The 
court   held   that   although   ordinarily   private   parties   have   “no   general   duty   to  
protect  others  from  the  criminal  attacks  of  third  parties,”  when  “the  defendant’s  
conduct has created an unreasonable risk of criminal misconduct, a duty is 
owed to those foreseeably  endangered.”216 A  private  investigator  “owes  a  duty  
to exercise reasonable care not to subject the third person to an unreasonable 
risk  of  harm.”217 Therefore,  “threats  posed  by  stalking  and  identity  theft  lead  us  
to conclude that the risk of criminal misconduct is sufficiently foreseeable so 
that an investigator has a duty to exercise reasonable care in disclosing a third 
person’s  personal  information  to  a  client.”218 
Remsburg is an important step forward in recognizing and remedying 
modern information privacy harms, yet it has not led to a revolution in tort law. 
Hardly any other cases have reached a conclusion similar to that in Remsburg. 
Although the case raises many questions that need further development, such as 
how broadly the duty recognized in Remsburg ought to apply, there have been 
scant attempts in tort law to explore the path that Remsburg has sketched out. 
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Warren  and  Brandeis’s  article  was  a  bold  recognition  of  a  group  of  harms 
against which the law did not offer adequate protection in the late nineteenth 
century. They argued that the common law afforded a right against these harms 
and urged courts to find ways to remedy them. And courts responded to their 
call in the traditional common law spirit.  
That spirit has been lost in privacy tort law. Instead of examining the 
harms and developing tort remedies to respond, the law merely attempts to fit 
cases into the four boxes that Prosser defined. If a harm does not fit into these 
boxes, it goes unremedied. It is time for the tort law of privacy to regain the 
creative spirit it once possessed. It must do so if it is to remain relevant to 
protect  privacy  in  today’s  Information  Age. 
CONCLUSION 
Prosser’s   legacy  of  privacy   law  is  a  mixed  one. On one hand, he helped 
infuse it with legitimacy and recognition, solidifying the privacy torts among 
the pantheon of other tort actions. But on the other hand, whether intentionally 
or not, Prosser had a stultifying effect on the privacy torts. Unlike the bold and 
generative spirit of the Warren and Brandeis article, Prosser’s   account   of  
privacy was rigid and ossifying. He expressed skepticism about the torts and 
urged caution.  
Like  a  deer  caught  in  the  headlights,  the  privacy  torts  froze  after  Prosser’s  
beam focused upon them. Prosser codified the torts in the Second Restatement 
of Torts, effectively locking them into their current form. The result is that the 
privacy torts are woefully inadequate to address the privacy problems we face 
today.  
The precise extent to which the development of the privacy torts owes its 
trajectory to Prosser can never be scientifically proven. We surmise that Prosser 
had a rather dramatic influence given his stature and the fact that privacy law 
developed in such a different way before, as opposed to after, his article.  
The great irony in the   story   is   that   Prosser’s   article   represented   the  
coronation of the privacy torts—their recognition by the greatest torts scholar 
of his generation—but also the beginning of their decaying relevance in 
addressing the privacy problems to come. Prosser thus helped and hindered the 
development of the privacy torts. If the tort law of privacy is to survive in the 
twenty-first  century,   it  must  finally  emerge  from  Prosser’s  shadow  and  regain  
some  of  Warren  and  Brandeis’s  dynamism.  
